the late 1990s-research similarly revealed high levels of unconstitutional searches. New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer, in conjunction with Jeffrey Fagan and Columbia University's Center for Violence Research and Prevention, reviewed documentation of more than 15,000 NYPD stop-and-frisk reports, and found that, citywide, 15.4 percent of the reports contained factual bases that were not sufficient to justify a stop and another 23.5 percent stated inadequate factual bases to allow a supervisor to determine whether there were sufficient facts to justify a stop-for a total of approximately 39 percent questionable searches. 3 To be sure, Gould and Mastrofski have raised the evidentiary bar with their article Suspect Searches by drawing on one of the first studies to conduct systematic physical observation of police searches. Rather than being based on written police reports-which raise clear issues of reliability-their new findings are drawn from the field notes of trained observers who accompanied and directly observed police officers on patrol. Any bias in this method-specifically, reactivity effects from direct observation of police practices-would likely tend to minimize a possibly higher real rate of unconstitutional searches. 4 Nevertheless, Gould and Mastrofski's empirical findings corroborate overall Spitzer's conclusions: about a third of police discretionary searches are constitutionally suspect.
The public policy debates that Gould and Mastrofski's article are likely to ignite will also, in all probability, have a familiar ring to them as well. The debates have been rehearsed in a number of policing controversies-not just stop-and-frisk policing on New York City streets, 5 but also racial profiling on the nation's highways 6 and drug-courier profiling at 2 Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. 3 See Civil Rights Bureau, Office of the New York Attorney General, The New York City Police Department's "Stop & Frisk" Practice: A Report from the Office of the Attorney General (December 1, 1999), at pp. 160B170. 4 In addition, Gould and Mastrofski bent backwards to minimize the risk of overstating the rate of unconstitutional searches by reading any factual and legal inferences in favor of the police while coding and consistently giving the police officers the benefit of any doubt in the coding process. See Gould and Mastrofski 2004 12 See, e.g., United States Commission on Civil Rights 2000:82B39B40, 80B84, 107B108. 13 My colleague at the University of Chicago, Tracey Meares, is working on a paper that argues against discretionary policing and in favor of non-discretionary type searches, such as mandatory road These positions in our public policy debates are familiar. If anything, a bit too familiar. In this essay, I would like to reframe the debates and in the process destabilize these positions. To make them a little less comfortable, a little less sanitized. To start to expose the real stakes. To begin to explore our own responsibility as observers, as social scientists, as commentators, as policy makers, and, yes, as public citizens. In effect, I would like to probe our own participation in these police searches. Buried in the Appendix to Gould and Mastrofski's article is a field note about one particular police-civilian encounter that raises especially troubling questions about social science, public policy, and citizenship. Let's start, then, with this field note in the Appendix.
I.
The lead police officer is described in very generic terms. He is a "white cop in his late twenties." Three other police officers are assisting him on the scene, only one of whom is identified, also in generic terms, also as a "white male in his late twenties." The officers have stopped a suspect who was riding a bike. The suspect is identified in the field notes, not surprisingly, as "a black male in his late twenties." The police have searched his pockets, his person, his backpack. They have not found anything-no drugs, no gun, no contraband. No evidence of crime. Nothing. But they decide to search a little further. They decide to look a little deeper. They decide to check under his testicles.
According to the trained field researcher physically observing the encounter, the young white police officer tells the young black suspect: "I bet you are hiding [drugs] under your balls. If you have drugs under your balls, I am going to fuck your balls up." 14 The police officer then tells the young black suspect to "get behind the police car, and pull his pants down to his ankles." The white police officer puts on "some rubber gloves." He then No contraband. Just a black man's empty rectum.
The citizen pulls his pants back up. The first cop on the scene tells him that he matched the description from a tip the police had received. [Note: "there was simply no evidence elsewhere in the report that the officers had ever received the call to which they The citizen repeats, for the fourth or fifth time, that he does not have any dealings with drugs, that "he didn't use or sell drugs." When he is told that he can leave, the citizen says "thank you" and takes off on his bike. For his part, the researcher walks back to the patrol car with the first cop on the scene, whose last words are "I know he had some drugs."
II.
It may be worth stopping here for a moment to experience this encounter in real time.
On a conservative estimate-assuming, for instance, that the police officer had rubber gloves right handy-the strip and cavity search took at least ninety seconds. That is a very conservative estimate, and yet it is a long time in which to ruminate, day dream, think, desire. What must have been going through the officer's mind when he started putting on those rubber gloves? Do you think that he felt bad that he was asking a grown man to drop his pants in public in order to feel his testicles? Do you think he was thinking to himself, "Man, I hate this job! I can't believe I have to stick my hand up this guy's ass." Or did he feel entirely self-righteous, proud that he was so selflessly promoting the public interest? Or alternatively did he experience a genuine moral dilemma about having to employ dirty means to achieve good ends-what we might call, after Carl Klockars, "The Dirty Harry Understanding? Did he think to himself, "One day, white man, your time will come. I will get you back-when you least expect it"? How did he feel when he got home that night?
What did he tell his kids? What did he do to his sex partner?
What about the trained social scientist, the observer, the researcher there on site, And did race play a role in the decision of the three back-up police officers not to intervene? Gould and Mastrofski surprisingly minimize the racial dimensions of these searches. They bend backward to emphasize the lack of a significant statistical relationship between race and the unconstitutionality of searches. "The absence of significant effects for wealth and race deserve special note, inasmuch as other research has shown these variables to influence justice outcomes," Gould and Mastrofski write. 17 But the fact is that eighty-four percent of their sample-96 of the searches studied-involved black suspects. Although we do not know the exact demographic breakdown for Middleberg, the fictitiously-named medium-size American city where the study was conducted-all we do know is that "many of the city's residents were African American, and many experienced concentrated disadvantage" 18 -it is hard to believe that the police could reach 84 percent searches of black suspects without some racial profiling. Might that have played a role or contributed in any way to the passivity of the three other police officers?
What about the social scientist who is witnessing, observing, and documenting this incident-taking notes, making a recording, memorializing the interaction? Is s/he responsible in any way for this incident? Does the social scientist have any obligation to step out of the scientific role and actively intervene? To breach the code of social scientific objectivity and prevent the search? Or to report it? Let's put aside personal ethics for a minute and focus on the more formal institutional duties that the researcher may have had.
There are, aren't there, some legal responsibilities that attach here? Among social scientists, it might be worth pausing here for a moment and exploring the question.
Without doubt, the actions of the police officer involve bodily harm to the suspect.
They are physically injurious, dehumanizing, and degrading at least with regard to one of the subjects of the research. In fact, the police conduct may well constitute a felony. In a number of jurisdictions, sexual battery includes anal penetration of another by any object without that person's consent. 19 Given that the actions of the lead police officer cause bodily harm-and may amount to a felony-the social scientist may very well have an obligation to report the incident to the university and to law enforcement officials. 21 First, with regard to the university, the field observation study underlying the Gould and Mastrofski article undoubtedly required human subjects committee (IRB) approval at the university level. A project such as this, even though it involves only "observation of public behavior," would not ordinarily be exempt from review because the disclosure of information beyond the research community "could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation." 22 This is straight from the Code of 19 It will depend on the jurisdiction, of course, and we are not told where the fictitiously-named city of Middleberg is actually located. I have chosen Florida purely hypothetically. 20 In Florida, consent is defined strictly. Consent requires "intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent and does not include coerced submission." Fla. Stat. §794.011(1)(a) (2004). For prosecutions against police officers under (4)(g), "acquiescence to a person reasonably believed by the victim to be in a position of authority or control does not constitute consent, and it is not a defense that the perpetrator was not actually in a position of control or authority if the circumstances were such as to lead the victim to reasonably believe that the person was in such a position." Fla. Stat. §794.011 (9) (2004) .
Another example would be California. Under the California Penal Code, Chap. 5, §289, forcible acts of sexual penetration include, at section (k)(1), "the act of causing the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of any person . . . by any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or by any unknown object." When the act "is accomplished against the victim's will by threatening to use the authority of a public official to incarcerate, arrest, or deport the victim or another, and the victim has a reasonable belief that the perpetrator is a public official," then it is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a period of three, six, or eight years. Cal. Penal Code §289(g) (2004). 21 I have no idea whether the researchers did or did not report this incident. I can only assume that they did, but I have no knowledge whatsoever. 22 
This is from the Manual of Procedures of the University of Arizona Human Subjects Protection
Federal Regulations concerning the protection of human subjects by the United States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and is usually incorporated verbatim in university IRB protocols.
As a result, the actions of the lead police officer would likely have to be reported to the university committee. The typical university approval requires as much. Here, for instance, is the actual text from a letter granting approval for a research project from the human subjects committee at a top American research university:
Approval is granted with the understanding that no further changes or additions will be made . . . without the knowledge and approval of the Human Subjects Committee and your College or Departmental Review Committee. Any research related physical or psychological harm to any subject must also be reported to each committee.
23
The failure to comply with these requirements could very well lead to academic discipline.
As an aside, it is worth remembering that the regulation of research concerning human subjects is no trivial affair. It had its origins in the Nuremberg trials. As the IRB
Guidebook of the Office for Human Research Protections of the DHHS explains:
The modern story of human subjects protections begins with the Nuremberg Code, developed for the Nuremberg Military Tribunal as standards by which to judge the human experimentation conducted by the Nazis. The Code captures many of what are now taken to be the basic principles governing the ethical conduct of research involving human subjects. The first provision of the Code states that "the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential." Freely given consent to participation in research is thus the cornerstone of ethical experimentation involving human subjects. The Code goes on to provide the details implied by such a requirement: capacity to consent, freedom from coercion, and comprehension of the risks and benefits involved. Other provisions require the minimization of risk and harm, a favorable risk/benefit ratio, qualified investigators using appropriate research designs, and freedom for the subject to withdraw at any time. (2) . 23 This is the actual text from a letter of approval for research at the University of Arizona. Kong, 1989 . The Declaration of Helsinki further distinguishes therapeutic from nontherapeutic research. 24 Now, in addition to the university IRB, the researcher who observed the improper cavity search may also need to report the incident to law enforcement authorities. 25 In a number of states, it is a misdemeanor to fail to report a crime that exposes a victim to bodily harm. In Florida again, a person who "has reasonable grounds to believe that he or she has observed the commission of a sexual battery" and who has "the present ability to seek assistance for the victim or victims by immediately reporting such offense to a law enforcement officer," but fails to seek assistance, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to a year for a first offense. Naturally, these questions raise a host of issues regarding the potential conflict of interest that the researcher may have experienced during the cavity search-issues close to, though somewhat distinct from the "dirty hands" dilemma that Stephen Mastrofski, Carl 24 Protecting Human Research Subjects: Institutional Review Board Guidebook, "Introduction" (available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/irb/irb_introduction.htm). 25 Here, for instance, is the actual text of a letter from a district attorney regarding a request for immunity for a research project:
We have reviewed your request for confidentiality in your interviews with research subjects for the above study. We agree to such confidentiality except where information may come to light about homicides, other serious crimes or crimes involving serious injury to others.
Therefore, if your research subjects should admit to homicide or other serious offenses as listed in [the state's penal code] or one involving serious injury to another, should this information be disclosed to us in any way, we would be required to act on the matter as we deem appropriate and proper. 26 Again, I have no knowledge whether s/he did. I am discussing this as a pure hypothetical matter.
Klockars, and others have debated. 27 The "dirty hands" dilemma, in its purest form, presents a challenge when the social scientist makes public policy recommendations. It emphasizes that the researcher is responsible for any harm that the policies may produce. Here, we are dealing with a slight variation on the theme, one that focuses on an earlier point in time. The question here is whether the research itself presents a moral dilemma. Does the collection of data require complicity with the delinquent police conduct? Do we have to dirty our hands
and not intervene so that we can obtain the data? And at what price? Do we self-censor our questions, our analyses, our conclusions so as not to alienate the police officer or the police department? Do we have to "get in bed" with the police so that they allow us to ride along and observe their daily practices? Did the researcher here stop her or himself from intervening precisely in order to maintain credibility with the police? And will this affect the 27 There are, in reality, three "dirty hands" problems that we need to distinguish. The first is the "Dirty Harry Problem" that Carl Klockars writes about (Klockars 1983 ). This first problem concerns the use of dirty means by a police officer to promote a good end. Then, second, there is the moral dilemma of the social scientist making policy recommendations: the fact is that the policy recommendations may create some harm, and in that sense the social scientist will have "dirty hands." As Lawrence Sherman explains, there are moral dilemmas when we apply social science to policy analysis. "These dilemmas make social science a morally 'dirty' means to a just and good end-a less violent world. It is a 'dirty' means because recommendations based on it may do some harm, even though the odds are against it." Lawrence W. Sherman, "Dirty Hands and Social Science," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 30(3):362B364 (August 1993). This is the "dirty hands" problem that Mastrofski writes about in his rejoinder (Mastroksfi and Uchida 1993). The third is the one I am interested here: how police researchers may have to "get in bed" with the cops in order to obtain their data-how they might have to self-censor their questions and analyses for fear of being shut out of the data. This is another form of "dirty hands" that has even more detrimental effects on the social science and policy analysis because it corrupts before anyone has the opportunity to formulate policy proposals.
police officer? Or do we assume that he was right-that the suspect probably had drugs on him, somewhere, maybe deeper?
Are we-you and me-responsible in any way for this body cavity search? IV.
The answer is "yes". Inevitably. We are responsible. We have chosen this cavity search and others like it. It is ours. After all, it does not come as a surprise, does it? It is not completely unexpected, not even surprising that the police would bend the constitution from time to time when conducting discretionary policing. We know it. We expect it.
Discretionary policing comes at a cost-and we knew it from the beginning. It was embedded in the very idea. Recall the original Broken Windows essay. How was it, after all, that the police dealt with the disorderly? "In the words of one officer," James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling wrote, "'We kick ass.'" 28 As Wilson and Kelling explained elsewhere in Broken Windows, the police "rough up" young toughs, and arrest on suspicion. 29 George
Kelling adds, fourteen years later:
Another officer in Chicago described in similar terms how he dealt with gang members who would not follow his orders: "I say please once, I say please twice, and then I knock them on their ass." The officer meant it: although a courteous and generally congenial man, he had grown up in Chicago's public housing developments and was not prepared to stand by and watch gangs terrorize his family, friends, and neighbors. 30 Order-maintenance policing comes with a heavy price tag. In this sense, we choose our forms of disorder. We choose our crimes. By engaging in an aggressive war on drugs through discretionary stop-and-frisk strategies, for instance, we are choosing this sexual battery and others. We can estimate how many there will be. We can predict, using actuarial models, how many C1's will have to drop their pants and spread their cheeks in public. It is a form of collateral damage that we can come to expect. What we want most, of course, is to keep it out of sight and out of mind. To deliberately not know it.
To not see it, not hear it, not think about it. It is, after all, extremely uncomfortableespecially for the tender-hearted among us. But it is predictable. It is to be expected.
In the end, we are responsible for this sexual battery. By setting our law enforcement priorities and opting for robust discretionary policing, we are choosing to have more of these cavity searches. We can effectively regulate these assaults-more so than other forms of deviance such as drug use or gun-carrying over which we have a little less control. Here we can regulate the amount. We can turn on more discretionary policing, and with it, more unconstitutional searches. We calibrate the amount of this crime. It happens under our watch.
It is the product of our choice. We put our hand up C1's rectum.
The great illusion is that all we are doing is fighting crime. That crime is out there, that we know what it is, that we simply go after it. This is the deepest fallacy. The fact is, we make crime. We decide what to criminalize and enforce and in the very process we allow other forms of deviance to flourish. Unconstitutional police searches are, tragically, but one perfect example. We set our scope on the drug war, we let loose discretionary policing, and we inevitably produce a certain amount-a predictable amount-of improper searches, of sexual batteries, of bodily injury. Sure, we can try to limit them with improved training and more civility. But still, we know they are going to happen. We can even predict how many will happen.
Discretionary policing involves a trade-off-a trade-off that we make with full knowledge. The most important thing in the public policy debates, then, is to decide, with eyes wide open and brutal honesty, how much unconstitutionality we are prepared to live with-how many sexual batteries of black suspects we are willing to perform. We get to decide. You get to decide. You choose our crime. So, how many of these cavity searches will you tolerate in order to pursue the goal of getting drugs off our streets? To get guns off our streets? And remember, you can't say "none" if you want the police to engage in proactive discretionary policing. You would be lying to yourself.
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